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FUNDING ENTREPRENEURIAL
VENTURES IN CHINA: PROPOSALS TO
MORE EFFECTIVELY REGULATE
CHINESE FOREIGN PRIVATE ISSUERS
“Laws are useless when men are pure, unenforceable when
men are corrupt.”1

INTRODUCTION

O

ver the past thirty years, the People’s Republic of China
has emerged into an economic juggernaut. 2 China has
leveraged its population of 1.3 billion people3 to industrialize at
an incredible rate.4 Three decades of 9 percent average annual
growth in gross domestic product (“GDP”)5 resulted in China
supplanting Japan as the world’s second largest economy in
2010. 6 Moreover, by focusing on infrastructure spending and

1. Chinese proverb.
2. See, e.g., Fan Gang, China’s Economic Growth in a Context of Globalization, 7 ASIE VISIONS (Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Paris,
France),
July
2008,
at
3,
available
at
http://www.ifri.org/downloads/AV7_FanGang_US.pdf; Gordon G. Chang, Chi(Dec.
16,
2008),
na
After
30
Years
of
Reform,
FORBES
http://www.forbes.com/2008/12/16/china-economic-reform-opedcx_gc_1216chang.html; Graeme Wearden, Chinese Economic Boom Has Been
(Aug.
16,
2010),
30
Years
in
the
Making,
GUARDIAN
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/aug/16/chinese-economic-boom.
3. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA), THE WORLD FACTBOOK, EAST &
SOUTHEAST
ASIA:
CHINA,
(2011),
available
at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html
[hereinafter WORLD FACTBOOK] (follow “Download Publication” hyperlink).
Data accurate as of July 2011. Id.
4. China’s economy today is ninety times larger than it was in 1978. Kevin Hamlin & Li Yanping, China Overtakes Japan as World’s Second-Biggest
Economy, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 16, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201008-16/china-economy-passes-japan-s-in-second-quarter-capping-three-decaderise.html.
5. Zuliu Hu & Mohsin S. Khan, Why Is China Growing So Fast?, 8 ECON.
ISSUES (Int’l Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.), Apr. 1997, at 1, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/issues8/issue8.pdf.
6. Becoming Number One: China’s Economy Could Overtake America’s
(Sept.
24,
2011),
Within
a
Decade,
ECONOMIST
http://www.economist.com/node/21528987 [hereinafter Becoming Number
One].
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the export of consumer goods to drive economic growth,7 China
has managed to largely avoid the financial turmoil that has
roiled developed economies, particularly the United States and
the European Union, since late 2007.8
The vibrancy of China’s economy has led to the emergence of
a middle class and a generation of “budding entrepreneurs”9
who seek to build new businesses and raise capital.10 Western
investors have been eager to seek investment opportunities in
these fast-growing Chinese businesses11 and to enter a market
that, a generation ago, was off-limits to outsiders.12 Foreign investment in Chinese firms, however, has been plagued with
problems.13 Regulators have discovered numerous instances of
corruption and fraud, often perpetrated through deceptive accounting practices, within Chinese companies publicly listed in
the United States.14 These revelations have resulted in international finger pointing between the United States Securities and

7. Colin Speakman, China Must Be Cautious in Raising Consumption,
CHINA DAILY (Nov. 21, 2008), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/200811/21/content_7228346.htm.
8. China is “basically carrying the world economy.” Kenneth Rapoza,
(July
31,
2011),
What’s
So
Great
About
China?,
FORBES
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2011/07/31/whats-so-great-aboutchina. While the rest of the world struggles, China’s economy is projected to
grow by 9.1% in 2011, down from 10.5% in 2010. Id.; WORLD FACTBOOK, supra
note 3.
9. David Barboza, Attention Shifts to China for Private Equity Industry,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2009, at B1.
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Peter Fuhrman, How Big Can the PE Industry in China
ALPHA
(Apr.
15,
2011),
Grow?,
SEEKING
http://seekingalpha.com/article/263654-how-big-can-the-pe-industry-in-chinagrow (citing a McKinsey & Company study finding that private equity capital
flowing into private Chinese companies could reach thirty billion dollars in
the next five years).
12. See generally David Finn, Peering over the Great Wall: Extraterritorial
Securities Regulation and U.S. Investment in China’s State Owned-Banks, 7
U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 277, 281–82 (2006) (describing how the opening of China’s financial market has attracted interest from U.S. investors).
13. Id. at 286.
14. Markets in China Are Barely Fazed by Scandal, Unless the State Is
(Aug.
20,
2011),
Involved,
ECONOMIST
http://www.economist.com/node/21526407 [hereinafter Markets in China].
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Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the China Securities Regulatory Commission.15
This Note explores the issues raised by such tainted firms
and suggests policy changes that may result in more effective
regulation of Chinese public companies. Specifically, this Note
argues that by implementing legislation that mirrors provisions of the United States’ Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, China
may be able to develop and, more importantly, enforce a stricter regulatory regime that will reduce corporate fraud. Part I of
this Note provides an overview of the Chinese economy’s transition from an inward, state-controlled system to a global power. Part II describes the opportunities attracting Western investors to China and the advantages to Chinese business of
seeking Western capital. Part III outlines the deficiencies of
the current Chinese regulatory system and reviews several recent transactions that have failed due to its insufficiency. Finally, Part IV suggests a regulatory framework that will allow
Chinese businesses to access the Western capital markets
while assuring investors that the companies are making fully
honest and transparent disclosures.
I. THE RISE OF CHINA
A. The Centralized Economy
One of the most remarkable aspects of China’s rise to the
global economic stage is the speed with which it occurred.16 Following the ascendency of the Communist Party of China
(“CPC”) in 1949,17 Chairman Mao Zedong instituted a series of
reforms that sought to institute a command economy in China
similar to that of the Soviet Union.18 The government seized
15. William Pentland, Deloitte Squeezed by SEC, Chinese Regulators,
(Sept.
10,
2011),
FORBES
http://www.forbes.com/sites/williampentland/2011/09/10/deloitte-squeezed-bysec-chinese-regulators.
16. See William I. Friedman, One Country, Two Systems: The Inherent
Conflict Between China’s Communist Politics and Capitalistic Securities
Market, 27 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 477, 479 (2002).
17. Id. at 477.
18. Todd Kennith Ramey, China: Socialism Embraces Capitalism? An Oxymoron for the Turn of the Century: A Study of the Restructuring of the Securities Markets and Banking Industry in the People’s Republic of China in an
Effort To Increase Investment Capital, 20 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 451, 453–54
(1998). See Friedman, supra note 16, at 477.
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control over land ownership and implemented harsh restrictions on human rights and business policies.19 In 1953, all
private businesses officially came under state control. 20 The
economy became centrally planned and rapidly focused on
manufacturing and industry. 21 However, this approach had
many disadvantages that ultimately suppressed growth22 and
China morphed into a “dormant economic giant.”23
B. The Beginnings of a Privatized Economy
Following Mao’s death, Deng Xiaoping came to power and, in
1978, began a series of major economic reforms known as the
“Open-Door Policy.”24 The Open-Door Policy advocated the use
of “market mechanisms and foreign resources . . . to speed up
the growth and modernization of the economy.”25 These reforms
were a stark departure from the rigid planning of the command
economy under Mao and generally followed a theme of “market-oriented socialism.” 26 The new economic plan included
banking and securities market reforms as well as a strengthening of the national economy by providing both domestic and
foreign investment capital to Chinese industries.27
“Limited privatization” 28 was an important part of Deng’s
Open-Door Policy and was promoted by the Chinese govern19. Ramey, supra note 18, at 454. Mao theorized that “this type of planned
economy would result in maximum productivity and efficiency, since the entire population would be employed for the good of the country.” Friedman,
supra note 16, at 477.
LEARNING
SITE,
20. China
1949
to
1953,
HIST.
http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/china_1949_to_1953.htm (last visited
Nov. 24, 2012).
21. Ramey, supra note 18, at 454.
22. Id. “[The] state-run economy produced few incentives for its people to
pursue operational efficiency, and no accountability for the profits or losses of
their businesses. As a result, the Chinese economy generated massive waste
and losses.” Friedman, supra note 16, at 477.
23. Hu & Khan, supra note 5, at 1.
24. Ramey, supra note 18, at 456.
25. Id. Deng Xiaoping characterized his reforms as “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” Friedman, supra note 16, at 478.
26. Ramey, supra note 18, at 456–62 (describing “market-oriented socialism” as a mixture of capitalist notions and social ideals).
27. Id. at 456.
28. “Limited privatization” refers to “minority private equity participation
in state-owned enterprises so as to enable the government to retain majority
control of the market.” Friedman, supra note 16, at 478.
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ment as a means to attract capital into the economy.29 By privatizing some industries, the government was able to sell its
stake to private interests while using the proceeds to reinvest
capital into the economy.30 The state still retained a controlling
interest in the “privatized” entity, however. 31 The concept of
“limited privatization” thus allowed the government to achieve
two objectives.32 First, the government was able to infuse capital into the economy, thereby promoting growth.33 Second, the
government was able to retain a position in these “privatized”
businesses to promote its socialist agenda and goals, 34 while
retaining full control of select industries such as the media.35
By achieving these two feats, “limited privatization” set the
stage for China’s economic renaissance.36
C. A Global Economic Power
The results of China’s economic reform were rapid. 37 Since
1978, when Deng Xiaoping removed hard-line Communist policies and began to promote the free-market, China’s economy
has increased in size ninety times over. 38 During this time,
China has seen an average growth of more than 9 percent per
year, with several peak years exceeding 13 percent growth in

29. Matthew D. Bersani, Privatization and the Creation of Stock Companies in China, 1993 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 301, 305. The CPC’s initiative has
been so successful that China now ranks second to the United States in terms
of inflows of foreign direct investment. Friedman, supra note 16, at 478.
30. Ramey, supra note 18, at 462.
31. Id. Some sectors of the economy were never subject to “limited privatization.” See id. at 464; Rick Carew, New Rules for Private Equity Investors in
ST.
J.
(Jan.
18,
2010,
8:25
AM),
China,
WALL
http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/01/18/new-rules-for-private-equity-investorsin-china. These included any enterprises involved with defense, mining, television or publishing, each deemed to be an industry of “strategic value” to the
government. Id.
32. See Friedman, supra note 16, at 478–79.
33. Id.
34. Id. The percentage of this controlling interest held by the state generally varies from 51-80% for exchange-listed companies. Ramey, supra note 18,
at 463.
35. Ramey, supra note 18, at 464; Carew, supra note 31.
36. See Friedman, supra note 16, at 479.
37. See id.
38. Hamlin & Yanping, supra note 4.
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GDP.39 From a broader perspective, the economy has successfully transitioned from an agrarian economy into an industrial
and service-based economy. 40 Three developments—out of
many more—are particularly illustrative. First, four out of five
Chinese were employed in agriculture in 1978; by 1994, that
number dropped to only one in two. 41 Second, four of the
world’s top ten companies today, as measured by market capitalization, are from China.42 Third, in August 2010, Agricultural Bank of China Limited closed the largest initial public offering ever at $22.1 billion.43
By focusing on areas like infrastructure spending, China has
largely avoided the worst of the “Great Recession” that continues to plague much of the developed world as of mid-2012.44 In
fact, China’s growth rate in 2009—the very height of the crisis—stood steady at 8.7%.45 Though there may be a number of

39. Hu & Khan, supra note 5, at 1. Before 1978, China saw annual growth
of about 6 percent per year, but with “painful ups and downs along the way.”
Id.
40. See generally Finn, supra note 12, at 285. See also Hu & Khan, supra
note 5, at 5 (reciting that the reforms began with the decollectivization of
agriculture and the development in rural areas of a non-agricultural employment sector).
41. Hu & Khan, supra note 5, at 5.
42. Hamlin & Yanping, supra note 4. These companies are PetroChina
Company, Industrial & Commercial Bank of China Limited, China Mobile
Limited, and China Construction Bank Corporation. Id.
43. Id. Five years after China’s first state-owned lender went public, the
country is now home to four of the world’s ten largest banks by market capitalization. Id. Throughout this Note, “$” refers to U.S. Dollars unless otherwise stated.
44. Geoff Dyer, China Embarks on Infrastructure Spending Spree, FIN.
TIMES (June 7, 2010, 5:55 PM), http://cachef.ft.com/cms/s/0/dc65a5c8-6fc211df-8fcf-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1acBNCaZZ. “New roads have been built
and gleaming airline terminals constructed, but the biggest emphasis has
been on rail, especially the rapidly expanding high-speed network. . . . China
plans to lay 18,640 miles of track by the middle of the decade at a cost of as
much as Rbm4,000 bn.” Id. China’s economic performance during the Great
Recession has been described as “the envy of the Western world.” Jeremy
Page, Many Rich Chinese Consider Leaving, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 1, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204394804577011760523331
438.html?mod=WSJ_hp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsTop (describing annual
GDP growth of 9.1% in the third quarter of 2011 and an International Monetary Fund estimate of 9.5% GDP growth for all of 2011).
45. China Economy Shows Strong Growth in 2009, BBC NEWS (Jan. 21,
2010, 13:14 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8471613.stm.
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factors for China’s success during the recession, China’s role as
a “resource vacuum” has played an undeniably important
role.46 For example, China is the world’s number one buyer of
iron ore and copper and number two importer of crude oil.47
With China’s 1.8 billion people, three decades of 9 percent
average growth in GDP per year, and an apparent immunity to
the global economic downturn occurring outside of its borders,
it is unsurprising that China has been quickly ascending the
International Monetary Fund’s ranking of countries by GDP.48
China, with a GDP of $5.9 trillion, surpassed Japan in 2010 to
become the world’s second largest economy.49 In the next decade, China is projected to overtake the United States and become the largest economy in the world.50 As the United States
struggles with debt-financing entitlement obligations and national security, 51 China holds about $1.2 trillion of United
States Treasury bills,52 making it the largest financier of U.S.
debt outside of the United States. 53 The tremendous investment China has accumulated in the United States makes certain that its rise will have a significant impact on the global
economy going forward.

46. Rapoza, supra note 8.
47. Hamlin & Yanping, supra note 4.
48. Becoming Number One, supra note 6.
49. Id.
50. Id. This determination assumes an average annual growth rate of 2.5%
for the United States. Id. Depending on the calculation of exchange rates, the
date could be even sooner. Id. The current calculation using purchasing power parity, which takes into account the relative cost of goods in the various
countries, shows that the United States and China are actually very close in
economic might and that China will overtake the United States by 2016. Id.
Calculation using current market prices leaves China further behind, though,
as does any formula involving GDP per person metrics. Id.
51. Jack Welch & Suzy Welch, Who Will Rule The 21st Century?,
BUS.
WK.
(July
1,
2007),
BLOOMBERG
http://www.businessweek.com/perm/content/07_27/b40410889.htm (“If not
dealt with, entitlements like Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid will
create a budget deficit that will explode over the next 20 years.”).
52. Tom Murse, How Much U.S. Debt Does China Really Own?,
ABOUT.COM, http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/moneymatters/ss/How-Much-USDebt-Does-China-Own.htm (last visited July 15, 2012). This equates to about
8 percent of publicly-held U.S. debt. Id. China is the third-largest holder, behind the Social Security Trust Fund and the Federal Reserve. Id.
53. See Rapoza, supra note 8.
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II. THE CHINESE ENTREPRENEUR AND WESTERN
OPPORTUNITIES FOR INVESTMENT
The introduction of “limited privatization” has had two sociological effects on the nation.54 First, market economic policies
have led to the rise of a large, wealthy middle class.55 Second,
an entrepreneurial spirit has developed within that middle
class,56 to which an increasingly educated Chinese populace is
seeking to cater by using research and technology to develop
fast-growing new ventures.57 This is a self-perpetuating effect
that will be central to China’s ability to sustain its incredible
rate of development.58
A. The New Middle Class
Since the state began to move towards “market-oriented” socialism, the United Nations estimates that China has lifted 300
million of its citizens out of poverty.59 Further, according to the
World Bank, China’s poverty rate has gone from 6% in 1996 to
2.8% in 2004.60 Presently, China’s middle class consists of 300
million people, or approximately 25% of the population.61 Ac54. See, e.g., Kenneth Rapoza, Two Funds To Profit off China’s Growing
Middle
Class,
FORBES
(Mar.
30,
2011,
3:43
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2011/03/30/if-chinas-middle-class-isgrowing-richer-why-cant-we;
Linda
Yueh,
China’s
Entrepreneurs,
Spring
2008,
at
15,
available
at
CENTREPIECE,
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/cp253.pdf.
55. Rapoza, supra note 54.
56. Yueh, supra note 54, at 15–18.
57. See Kathrin Hille, China Searches for the Next Steve Jobs, FIN. TIMES
(Oct. 21, 2011, 1:50 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/7621faf6-fad5-11e0-8fe700144feab49a.html#axzz1hFOuCSNA.
58. Simeon Djankov et al., Who Are China’s Entrepreneurs?, CEPR Discussion Paper no. 5706, CTR. FOR ECON. POL. RES., June 2006, available at
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~groland/pubs/AERChina.pdf.
59. Hamlin & Yanping, supra note 4. “The country remains a developing
nation, with its per capita gross national income ranked 127th in the world . .
. behind Angola and Azerbaijan, according to the World Bank.” Id. The large
size of China’s population, however, does not work to its benefit when measuring that metric. Id.
60. Rapoza, supra note 54.
61. Peter Ford, In China, Middle-Class Affluence, Not Political Influence,
SCI.
MONITOR
(May
20,
2011,
1:00
PM),
CHRISTIAN
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2011/0520/In-Chinamiddle-class-affluence-not-political-influence. This figure is projected to double by 2025, according to a study by McKinsey & Company. Id.
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cording to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, families
with assets valued from RMB150,000 ($18,137) to RMB300,000
($36,275) are to be classified as middle class. 62 This middle
class is composed of “a range of different sorts of white-collar
people—entrepreneurs, employees of large state-owned enterprises and multinational companies, CPC officials, lawyers,
doctors, and teachers.”63 The ascent of this middle class may
perhaps be most clear when considering that many children of
parents who were assigned manual labor jobs by the CPC a
generation ago now work at start-up companies.64 The philosophy of the new Chinese middle class is that money may be the
only possible means of achieving personal autonomy in a nation
where political freedoms are still very restrained.65
B. The Chinese Entrepreneur
Entrepreneurism in China has been a catalyst for the nation’s economic growth since the late 1990s.66 Rising expectations and the constant drive for money has driven a new generation of Chinese, many of whom were not even born at the time
of the 1978 reforms, to become entrepreneurs. 67 The reforms
under Deng Xiaoping and the Open-Door Policy granted greater autonomy to enterprise managers,68 allowing them to truly
control their businesses by pricing goods at competitive levels,
hiring efficient workers and firing inefficient workers, and re62. Xin Zhigang, Dissecting China’s ‘Middle Class’, CHINA DAILY (Oct. 27,
2004),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/200410/27/content_386060.htm. While these numbers may seem low, it is important to remember the purchasing power parity discrepancy between China
and Western nations, as well as China’s per capita GDP rests around $2000.
Gang, supra note 2, at 10. Throughout this Note, “RMB” refers to Chinese
Renminbi unless otherwise stated.
63. Ford, supra note 61.
64. See, e.g., id. (describing the youngest generation of Chinese as being
able to afford luxuries, such as cars and vacations, which were unknown to
their parents’ generation).
65. Id. One “middle class” woman interviewed for the article stated her
belief in the power of money to ensure well-being. Id. As an example, she cited the tainted infant milk scandal of 2008, where over 12,000 babies were
poisoned by adulterated milk. Id. Middle class families, she says, were able to
afford imported baby formula. Id.
66. Yueh, supra note 54, at 15. In 2006, the World Bank estimated that
there were 40 million small- and medium-sized enterprises in China. Id.
67. See generally id. at 15–18.
68. Hu & Khan, supra note 5, at 5.
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taining corporate earnings for future investment.69 These enterprises have developed new products, created jobs, paid taxes, and have “g[iven] the national economy a flexibility and resiliency” that was absent under Mao’s leadership.70 As the CPC
relinquishes its control of business, the emergence of entrepreneurs has “transformed the economy into one increasingly
driven by competition, innovation and productivity,”71 resulting
in private company growth of over 30 percent per year.72
A major challenge faced by those seeking to start their own
businesses in China has been access to credit.73 It is estimated
that less than 0.5 percent of Chinese small- and medium-sized
businesses can obtain loans from local banks.74 Chinese banks,
despite the “limited privatization” movement, remain stateowned and prefer to issue credit to “politically favored government companies.”75 In addition, seed investment capital, money
typically available in mature markets to fund start-up ventures, is almost non-existent in China.76 To some extent, this
unwillingness to lend reflects a more conservative Chinese investment philosophy.77 Chinese venture capitalists, a nascent
industry itself, 78 prefer companies with fully developed prod69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Yueh, supra note 54, at 18.
72. Fuhrman, supra note 11 (“[These companies] have the scale, experience, management and market leadership to continue to double in size every
two to three years.”).
73. Yueh, supra note 54, at 16.
74. Id. A survey shows that only 7 percent of entrepreneurs have adequate
funding to capitalize their businesses. Id.
75. Joe McDonald, China Promises More Loans for Small Companies,
GLOBE
(Oct.
12,
2011),
BOSTON
http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2011/10/12/china_promises_more_loa
ns_for_small_companies. Approximately 70 percent of bank loans finance
companies controlled by the state, despite the fact that the state sector produces only 34 percent of total industrial output. Ramey, supra note 18, at
483.
76. China’s Emerging Venture Capital Opportunities, ESCAPEARTIST.COM,
http://www.escapeartist.com/OREQ29/Chinas_Emerging_Venture_Capital_O
pportunities.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2012).
77. See id.
78. Venture capitalists typically raise funds from institutional investors,
such as pension funds, endowments, and foundations. FAQ, NAT’L VENTURE
CAPITAL
ASS’N,
http://www.nvca.org/index.php?Itemid=147&id=119&option=com_content&vi
ew=article (last visited Oct. 3, 2012). China currently lacks “experienced pen-
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ucts, a customer base, and a sales history when evaluating an
investment. 79 Because of the unwillingness of banks to lend
and the absence of early-stage “angel” investors, Chinese businesses have been forced to turn to a high-interest underground
credit market akin to loan-sharking.80
C. Reverse Mergers as a Means to Access the American Capital
Markets
Chinese companies seeking a stable source of funding are eager to bypass the local funding regime entirely.81 These businesses often seek to access the broad capital markets of the
United States.82 At the same time, due to China’s confluence of
a large population, increasingly educated populace, and rising
standards of living, American investors are eager to provide
capital to Chinese companies that offer access to the bourgeoning Chinese market.83 The potential for growth investment in
China is illustrated by the Halter USX CHINA Index,84 which
posted a gain of 60% in 2009.85 Following the dot-com boom of

sion funds and other big institutional investors that provide the backbone of
private-equity funding in the West.” Carew, supra note 31.
79. China’s Emerging Venture Capital Opportunities, supra note 76.
80. McDonald, supra note 75. An economist at Credit Suisse recently valued the Chinese “informal lending” market at four trillion yuan ($615 billion)
and growing at a rate of approximately 50 percent a year. Id.
81. Barbarians in Love: Global Private-Equity Firms Are Seduced by the
(Nov.
25,
2010),
China
Dream,
ECONOMIST
http://www.economist.com/node/17580583 [hereinafter Barbarians in Love].
82. Robert G. DeLaMater, Recent Trends in SEC Regulation of Foreign
Issuers: How the U.S. Regulatory Regime Is Affecting the United States’ Historic Position as the World’s Principal Capital Market, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J.
109, 109 (2006) (“Since World War II, the United States has been the world’s
principal capital market . . . with substantial retail participation by individual investors and small institutions, plentiful capital for equity financing and
a willingness to hold long-term debt securities.”).
83. Barbarians in Love, supra note 81 (describing China as particularly
“seductive” for Westerners).
84. “The Halter index is composed of U.S.-listed Chinese companies, ranging from the American depositary shares of well-known names like Internet
giant Baidu.com (ticker: BIDU) and telecom power China Mobile (ticker:
CHL) to small-cap reverse mergers.” Bill Alpert & Leslie P. Norton, Beware
(Aug.
28,
2010),
This
Chinese
Export,
BARRON’S
http://online.barrons.com/article/SB50001424052970204304404575449812943
183940.html.
85. Id.
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the early 2000s,86 Western investors have been excited to explore similar speculation in alternative markets such as China.87
The result of Western investment interest and the Chinese
desire to access the more developed Western capital markets
has been the rapid emergence of Chinese companies choosing
to list their securities on American stock exchanges.88 The most
common route chosen to list in the United States by these companies has been the reverse merger.89 A reverse merger occurs
when a private Chinese company is merged into an existing
American public shell company.90 The American shell company’s board resigns, and then the new Chinese board assumes
control, changes the company’s name, and begins to issue
86. In the 1990s, speculation over new technology, particularly the rise of
the Internet, led stock market prices to climb rapidly, in what became known
as the “dot-com boom.” ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON,
UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW 136 (3d ed. 2009). On March 10, 2000, the
NASDAQ closed at 5,048.62, and the bubble promptly burst. Tony Long,
March 10, 2000: Pop Goes the NASDAQ!, WIRED (Mar. 10, 2010, 12:00 AM),
http://www.wired.com/thisdayintech/2010/03/0310nasdaq-bust. As late as
March 2010, the NASDAQ remained approximately 50 percent below its alltime high. Jim Zarroli, A Decade Later, NASDAQ Is Half Its All-Time High,
NPR
(Mar.
10,
2010),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=124537450.
87. See Finn, supra note 12, at 285–86. The small business start-up scene
in China has been described as having a “frenetic feel” to it, similar to the
dot-com boom days. Ron Gluckman, Seeding China’s Start-Up Scene, With a
Nod to Silicon Valley, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2011, 8:22 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/12/15/seeding-chinas-start-up-scene-with-anod-to-silicon-valley.
88. Alpert & Norton, supra note 84.
89. Jamil Anderlini, Investing: Problems Flagged Up, FIN. TIMES (July 4,
2011,
8:26
PM),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6f5c9c8e-a671-11e0-ae9c00144feabdc0.html.
90. Aden R. Pavkov, Ghouls and Godsends? A Critique of “Reverse Merger”
Policy, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 475, 478 (2006). A shell company is a company
with no assets, only access to a public market for its securities. Id. For example, Chinese medical-device vendor Winner Group merged into Las Vegas
Resorts, a liquidated American shell company. Alpert & Norton, supra note
84. Chinese tire maker Zhongsen International merged into Rub A Dub Soap.
Id. Chinese chemical company Keyuan Petrochemicals merged into Silver
Pearl, a failing furniture import business based in Rockwall, TX. Walter Pavlo, Fraud in Chinese Reverse Mergers on American Exchanges—And We’re
(Apr.
8,
2011,
4:50
PM),
Surprised?,
FORBES
http://www.forbes.com/sites/walterpavlo/2011/04/08/fraud-in-chinese-reversemergers-on-american-exchanges-and-were-surprised.
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shares to the public.91 A reverse merger allows a company to
start accessing the U.S. public markets without going through
the lengthy initial public offering (“IPO”) formalities controlled
by the SEC.92 By not having to officially file for an IPO, companies avoid the legal and auditing fees associated with negotiating with underwriters.93 More significantly, companies listing
by reverse merger are not required to file a registration statement for review by the SEC.94
About 350 Chinese reverse mergers have closed since 2003.95
Though deals of this nature rarely exceed one billion dollars in
market capitalization, these 350 transactions have a combined
capitalization of over fifty billion dollars. 96 Because of this
strategy, Chinese foreign issuers are able to access American
capital markets without regulatory review of their disclosure
and without oversight as to whether their financial statements
were properly audited. 97 In the late 2000s, a combination of
American regulators, auditors, and activist investors began to
unveil many Chinese companies listing in the United States as
frauds, threatening American investors, tarnishing the reputa-

91. Bruce Einhorn & Frederik Balfour, Going Public, Chinese Style,
BLOOMBERG
BUS.
WK.
(Mar.
5,
2007),
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_10/b4024067.htm.
For
example, Ticketcart Inc., a defunct online retailer of printer cartridges, was
merged with Tieli Xiaoxinganlin Frog Breeding Company, a Chinese nutritional supplements retailer, to allow the Chinese company to go public in the
United States. Id.
92. Floyd Norris, The Audacity of Chinese Frauds, N.Y. TIMES, May 26,
2011, at B1; Double Due Diligence Efforts Before Investing, CHINA L. & PRAC.
(Sept. 2, 2011), available at 2011 WLNR 18879796.
93. Norris, supra note 92.
94. Id.
95. Alpert & Norton, supra note 84.
96. Id.
97. Francine McKenna, Chinese Reverse Merger Companies: The Auditor
(Mar.
15,
2011,
4:29
PM),
Angle,
FORBES
http://www.forbes.com/sites/francinemckenna/2011/03/15/chinese-reversemerger-companies-the-auditor-angle. U.S. federal securities law requires
publicly registered companies to file financial statements with the SEC that
are audited by PCAOB-registered auditing firms. Q&A: Small Business and
SEC.
AND
EXCHANGE
COMMISSION,
the
SEC,
U.S.
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/qasbsec.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2012). A
PCAOB study concluded that, following the closing of a reverse merger, the
shell company’s auditor is frequently dismissed and replaced with the Chinese operating company’s auditor. McKenna, supra note 97.
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tion of the Chinese economy, and ultimately harming the interests of Chinese entrepreneurs seeking foreign capital.98
III. DEFICIENCIES IN THE CHINESE REGULATORY SYSTEM AND
CORPORATE FRAUD
Some have described the oversight of “foreign private issuers,” including Chinese companies listed on U.S. securities exchanges, as a “regulatory vacuum,”99 with neither the United
States nor China effectively monitoring those companies that
list via reverse merger. The lack of oversight has resulted in
massive losses by international investors, which continue as of
this writing. This Part describes the current regulation of securities in the United States and China and the deficiencies that
the Chinese system faces with regards to enforcement. It then
provides an explanation for the underperformance of Chinese
reverse merger listings and the instances of corporate fraud
that regulators and investors have unveiled. Lastly, this Part
examines both the current regulatory abyss in which Chinese
foreign private issuers find themselves and the inability of
American and Chinese regulators to find compromise.
A. A Tale of Two Regulatory Regimes
In the United States, the federal securities laws “establish
mandatory disclosure of the business and financial conditions

98. It is important to note that many well-established Chinese companies
list on American exchanges through means other than reverse mergers. Steve
Dickinson, Thinking Clearly About Chinese Companies Listed on US Stock
Exchanges. Or, If a Tree Falls in a Sino-Forest . . ., CHINA L. BLOG (July 1,
2011),
http://www.chinalawblog.com/2011/07/thinking_clearly_about_chinese_compa
nies_listed_on_us_stock_exchanges.html. They are typically governmentcontrolled companies that concurrently trade on either the Shanghai or
Shenzhen stock exchanges. Id. These companies form the heart of the Chinese industrial and service economy. Examples include China Eastern Airlines Corporation, China Life Insurance Company Limited, China Mobile,
and China Unicom. See id. These companies are considered Chinese “bluechips” and have not been implicated in any fraudulent activity. See id. Companies pursuing the reverse merger route tend to be small-cap technology
companies operating under unique structures such as the VIE (variable interest entity). See id.
99. Anderlini, supra note 89.
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of public companies.”100 Congress set forth the regulatory regime for securities issuers primarily through two pieces of legislation that together constitute the U.S. federal securities
laws: the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”).101
The Securities Act applies to an issuer’s initial offering of securities.102 Domestic companies wishing to issue their securities to the public must have the approval of the SEC.103 Prospective issuers gain such approval through a multistep process, typically beginning with the company filing a registration
statement on Form S-1104 and disclosing information about the
issuer, the security offered, and any potential underwriters.105
Under the Securities Act, companies must make full disclosure
of all pertinent information to potential investors in the registration statement.106 Further, the SEC requires that financial
statements, audited by an independent certified public accountant, accompany the registration statement.107 The registration statement is reviewed by the SEC and, in the event the
SEC makes comments about the filing, subsequently revised by
the issuer.108 Once the SEC fully approves the document, it is

100. James A. Fanto & Roberta S. Karmel, A Report on the Attitudes of Foreign Companies Regarding a U.S. Listing, 3 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 51, 53
(1997).
101. Q&A: Small Business and the SEC, supra note 97.
102. Fanto & Karmel, supra note 100, at 53.
103. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (2011) (amended 2012). Companies cannot offer their securities for sale until the SEC staff declares the
company’s registration statement “effective.” Q&A: Small Business and the
SEC, supra note 97.
104. All forms are SEC forms unless otherwise stated.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 77g.
106. Q&A: Small Business and the SEC, supra note 97 (defining “full disclosure” as “the facts investors would find important in making an investment decision.”). Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis once observed that
“sunshine is the best disinfectant, electric light the best policeman.” PINTO &
BRANSON, supra note 86, at 167. One of the main purposes of the “full and fair
disclosure” philosophy is to prevent fraud by eliminating three mechanisms
through which fraud manifests itself: “non-disclosure, half-truth, [and] disclosure in a misleading way.” Id. at 168. Full and fair disclosure encourages
efficient public capital markets and protects prospective investors. Pavkov,
supra note 90, at 496.
107. Q&A: Small Business and the SEC, supra note 97.
108. Id.
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declared “effective” and the issuer is free to become a public
reporting company.109
The Exchange Act governs the subsequent issuance and trading of securities by requiring public companies to file timely
reports with the SEC relating to their ongoing financial performance and operations. 110 These reports include an annual
report with audited financial statements on Form 10-K, as well
as quarterly reports with unaudited financial statements on
Form 10-Q and current reports concerning certain episodic
events on Form 8-K.111
Compliance with the federal securities laws, particularly the
initial registration of securities by a new issuer under the Securities Act, entails significant cost.112 Section 11 of the Securities Act imposes liability upon every person who signed the registration statement for “any untrue statement of a material
fact” contained “in any part of the registration statement.”113
Due to the considerable degree of liability involved, issuers are
wise to retain legal counsel and an accounting firm that will
“credibly audit and certify financial statements.”114

109. Marshall Brain, How NASDAQ IPOs Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS,
http://money.howstuffworks.com/nasdaq-ipo.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2012).
110. Fanto & Karmel, supra note 100, at 53; Pavkov, supra note 90, at 496.
111. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2011) (amended
2012). See PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 86, at 162–63. Episodic events triggering an 8-K filing include “a change in control, bankruptcy, [and] resignation or dismissal of the outside auditors . . . .” Id. at 163.
112. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 86, at 172. Aside from legal expenses,
fees include auditing expenses, SEC registration fees, and the cost of printing
copies of the issuer’s prospectus once finalized. Id.
113. 15 U.S.C. § 77k; PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 86, at 171. Section 11
liability is vast.
Defendants under [Section 11 of the Securities Act] include the issuer, every person who signed the registration statement (the principal
executive officer, chief financial officer, comptroller or other chief accounting officer, and a majority of directors must sign), every person
who was a director, those named as becoming a director, and every
accountant, engineer, appraiser or “other person whose profession
gives authority to a statement made by him” who “expertises” or certifies a portion of the registration statement. The issuer is strictly liable.
Id. (emphasis in original).
114. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 86, at 171.
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The accountancy firms reviewing the financial statements of
public reporting companies in the United States are themselves
regulated by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(“PCAOB”).115 The PCAOB is a nonprofit organization that provides regulatory oversight to the audits of public companies.116
The organization seeks to “protect the interests of investors”
and ensure the dissemination of “informative, accurate and independent audit reports.”117 The PCAOB was created as part of
the reforms promulgated under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(“SOX”) in response to a wave of corporate and accounting
scandals in the United States.118
China’s securities regulatory regime, particularly with respect to enforcement, is decidedly primitive as compared to
115. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2011).
116. See id.
117. Id. The SEC oversees the PCAOB and approves the rules, standards,
and budget proffered by the PCAOB. About the PCAOB, PUB. COMPANY ACCT.
OVERSIGHT BOARD, http://pcaobus.org/About/Pages/default.aspx (last visited
Sept. 7, 2012). The PCAOB is funded by annual fees assessed to public reporting companies according to their market capitalization. See id. The
PCAOB is managed by a board appointed to staggered five-year terms by the
SEC, in consultation with the Federal Reserve and the Secretary of the
Treasury. See id. Potential sanctions, which the PCAOB may levy on audit
firms for violations of its standards, include “fines, censures, removal from
client arrangements, limitations on activities, and suspension from audit
functions on a temporary or permanent basis.” John Paul Lucci, Enron—The
Bankruptcy Heard Around the World and the International Ricochet of Sarbanes-Oxley, 67 ALB. L. REV. 211, 223 (2003).
118. About the PCAOB, supra note 117. The most prominent of the corporate and accounting scandals of 2001-02 was the December 2001 collapse of
Enron. See Lucci, supra note 117, at 211–12 (“Financial scandals involving
WorldCom, Qwest, Global Crossing, Tyco, and Enron ultimately cost shareholders $460 billion.”). Enron was a Houston, TX-based corporation engaged
in energy and commodities trading. Gary M. Cunningham & Jean E. Harris,
Enron and Arthur Andersen: The Case of the Crooked E and the Fallen A, 3
GLOBAL PERSP. ON ACCT. EDUC. 27, 31 (2006). Enron was once the seventh
largest company in the United States by market capitalization. Dan Ackman,
(Jan.
15,
2002,
12:00
PM),
Enron
the
Incredible,
FORBES
http://www.forbes.com/2002/01/15/0115enron.html. Enron’s auditor, Arthur
Andersen LLP, was considered one of the most prestigious accounting firms
in the world. Cunningham & Harris, supra note 118, at 31. Enron imploded
in the fall of 2001 after the revelation of a series accounting irregularities and
instances of insider trading amongst Enron senior executives. See id. at 34,
40–44. Arthur Andersen was convicted in June 2002 of obstruction of justice
for shredding accounting working papers in connection with the Enron audit
and eventually dissolved. See id. at 34, 44–45.
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what exists in the United States.119 This has resulted in a Chinese securities market that has been described as “notoriously
corrupt and ‘casinolike [sic].’”120 The primary government regulator in China is its equivalent of the SEC,121 the China Securities Regulatory Commission (“CSRC”). 122 The powers of the
CSRC are delineated in the Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China (“Chinese Securities Laws”),123 which sets forth
the regulatory regime for both initial and subsequent offerings
of securities by Chinese companies.124 The CSRC’s basic functions, similar to the SEC, include general supervisory powers
over the securities markets; 125 verification, examination, and
approval of public offerings of securities;126 and, notably, “supervis[ing] the securities market behaviors of the listed compa-

119. See Friedman, supra note 16, at 484. China adopted its first national
securities law on December 29, 1998. Id. The Securities Law of the People’s
Republic of China took effect on July 1, 1999. Id. The law has subsequently
been amended, most recently in October 2005. Baoshu Wang & Hui Huang,
China’s New Company Law and Securities Law: An Overview and Assessment, 19 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 229, 229 (2008). The revisions took effect on January 1, 2006. See id. See also Finn, supra note 12, at 286 (“The relative immaturity of China’s legal system poses a number of obstacles to its effectiveness.”).
120. Dina Jie Yin, Note, Investor Regulations: An American Answer to a
Chinese Problem, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 397, 412 (2004) (quoting Kevin Hamlin,
China’s Iron Lady: Premier Zhu Rongji Hired Laura Cha To Rein in China’s
Casinolike Stock Markets. Critics Say She’s Hurting the Economy—But She’s
Not Backing Down, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (INT’L ED.), Vol. 27, Issue 5, May
1, 2002).
121. See Friedman, supra note 16, at 484 (discussing how the CSRC, a regulatory body “subordinate to the State Council,” is similar to the United States
scheme, in which the SEC is “subordinate to the executive branch.”). In addition, the CSRC draws its regulatory authority by a grant from the legislature
through their promulgation of the Chinese Securities Laws. Id. at 485. Similarly, the SEC was created through Congressional passage of the Exchange
Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d.
122. See Friedman, supra note 16, at 484.
123. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengquan Fa [ZHENGQUAN FA]
[Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1998, effective July 1, 1999, amended Aug. 28, 2004 and Oct. 27, 2005), art. 166–74 (China), available at
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/laws/rfdm/statelaws/200904/t20090429_1
02757.htm.
124. See id. art. 10–77 (China).
125. See id. art. 166 (China).
126. See id. art. 10, 167(5) (China).
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nies and their shareholders who shall fulfill the relevant obligations according to the relevant laws and regulations.”127
As under the Securities Act in the United States, the registration of new securities in China must be accompanied by legal, accounting, and financial reports. 128 Similar to the Exchange Act in the United States, public companies in China
must file periodic reports with the CSRC disclosing their financial condition and performance.129 However, there is no independent accounting oversight body similar to the PCAOB in
China.130 Therefore, the responsibility to police companies’ disclosures and enforce the submission of accurately audited financial statements rests with the CSRC alone.131
Structurally, the CSRC is an institution within the State
Council, China’s most powerful executive body. 132 Some have
127. China Securities and Regulatory Commission, CHINA SEC. REG.
COMMISSION, http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/about/who/intro (last visited
Sept. 7, 2012). Further, the CSRC’s mandate states that the body will “regulate, according to law, the securities business activities of . . . those law firms,
public accounting firms and asset appraisal organizations that are engaged in
securities business.” ZHENGQUAN FA, art. 167(3) (China).
128. ZHENGQUAN FA, art. 58 (China).
129. See id. art. 60–62 (China). However, while the Exchange Act requires
annual, quarterly, and current reports, the Chinese Securities Laws require
annual reports, “interim” reports every six months, and “ad hoc” reports upon
certain triggering events. 15 U.S.C. § 78m; ZHENGQUAN FA, art. 60–62 (China).
130. See Andrea Shalal-Esa & Sarah N. Lynch, Exclusive: Justice Department Probing Chinese Accounting, REUTERS (Sept. 29, 2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/29/us-china-usa-accountingidUSTRE78S3QM20110929 (quoting Robert Khuzami, Director of Enforcement at the SEC, that inadequate accounting and audit review in China is “a
big issue” and “not acceptable”). Interestingly, the Chinese constitution does
contemplate accounting oversight, as evidenced by the constitution’s establishment, within the State Council, of an Auditor-General position that oversees an independent auditing body. XIANFA art. 86, 91 (1982) (China). However, the auditing body’s jurisdiction is limited to regulating the “auditing [of]
revenue and expenditure of departments under the State Council” and local
municipalities. Id. art. 91, § 3 (China). This limited jurisdiction of the Auditor-General is further clarified in the Chinese Securities Laws, which describe the Auditor-General’s authority over “stock exchanges, securities companies, securities registration and clearing institutions and the securities
regulatory authority.” ZHENGQUAN FA, art. 9 (China).
131. See ZHENGQUAN FA, art. 65 (China).
132. Id. art. 7 (China). The State Council is “the executive body of the highest organ of state power[ and] the highest organ of state administration.”
XIANFA art. 85 (China). The membership of the State Council consists of the

392

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 38:1

recognized this lack of independence as being problematic for
enforcement purposes.133 A survey of mature economies shows
that the chief regulatory body is typically structured independently to ensure enforcement efficacy.134 In China, though,
the government has dual interests, only one of which is regulation.135 Since the CPC still has a large presence in some industries that were deemed off-limits to the “limited privatization”
movement, the government remains a dominant shareholder in
many companies.136 The CSRC, as a State Council agency, is
therefore placed in the position of regulating a securities market in which the government is a significant participant.137 It is
not difficult to imagine situations where the government “encourages” the CSRC to back off of a regulatory enforcement ac-

Premier, Vice-Premiers, State Councilors, State Ministers, the AuditorGeneral, and the Secretary-General. Id. The State Council can be compared
to the executive branch of the U.S. government. See K.C. FUNG ET AL., U.S.
DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CHINA 37 (2006) (commenting that “the State Council .
. . represents the executive branch.”). The State Council “carr[ies] out the
principles and policies of the [CPC] as well as the regulations and laws
adopted by the [National People’s Congress], and dealing with such affairs as
China’s internal politics, diplomacy, national defense, finance, economy, culture and education.” The State Council, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE,
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/data/organs/statecouncil.shtml (last visited
Sept. 7, 2012).
133. HUI HUANG, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS: INSIDER TRADING
LAW IN CHINA 86 (2006).
134. Id. (citing the SEC in the United States, the FSA in the United Kingdom, and the ASIC in Australia as three examples of regulator independence). “It goes without saying in developed securities markets that a securities regulatory body should be structured independently to enable it to effectively carry out its regulatory role.” Id.
135. Id.
136. See Ramey, supra note 18, at 464; Carew, supra note 31. The state
shows no sign of relinquishing control of certain sectors, such as “national
securities-related industries, natural monopolies, sectors providing important
goods and services to the public, and important enterprises in pillar industries and the high-technology sector.” Donald C. Clarke, Law Without Order
in Chinese Corporate Governance Institutions, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 131,
144 (2010).
137. HUANG, supra note 133, at 86 (estimating that state-owned shares
make up about two-thirds of all shares on the market). Further, the CSRC’s
main enforcement tool is referral to the judiciary. See ZHENGQUAN FA, art.
173 (China). The judiciary branch in China is equally conflicted with respect
to the CPC and government interests. See Clarke, supra note 136, at 182.
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tion against a company illicitly making large profits where the
CPC is the controlling shareholder.138
Conflicts of interest aside, the enforcement power of the
CSRC is rather limited.139 There is evidence that the agency
has trouble securing funding and retaining talent.140 For one
example, the CSRC employs only 1,465 staff despite China’s
enormous population. 141 The agency’s powers to investigate
companies and collect evidence are therefore limited.142 To provide a second example of the CSRC’s weak legitimacy, Chinese
courts often do not cooperate with the agency’s requests to
freeze corporate assets. 143 The passive judicial response to
CSRC inquiries is partially due to the fact that Chinese judges
are the appointees of local political authorities.144 Yet there is
also a procedural element involved, as Chinese plaintiffs must
file suit in the defendant’s domicile.145 A corporate defendant is
likely either controlled by the local government or, if the company has been privatized under the 1978 reforms, by locally
influential executives.146 The local government and court officials may have an interest in the company’s performance. 147
Therefore, due to locality interests, these courts are satisfied to
allow a local company to continue operating without regulatory
interference.148 In sum, while the CSRC ostensibly appears to
mirror the SEC’s goals and regulations, the agency is largely
138. See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 136, at 180.
If the securities markets are not paying good money for issues of
[state-owned enterprises’] stock, then the CSRC is not doing its job,
and if clamping down on abuses would hurt the markets—for example, by obstructing the flow of funds into the market from illegal
sources—then the CSRC may not have the political will to do so.
Id.
139. See HUANG, supra note 133, at 84–86.
140. See id. at 84–85 (explaining that many Chinese view the CSRC has a
training ground for private sector financial employment).
141. Id. at 84.
142. Id. at 86.
143. Id.
144. Clarke, supra note 136, at 182. In addition to corruption and vulnerability to political pressure, Chinese judges tend to have a low level of education. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
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ineffective in enforcing the Chinese Securities Laws, thereby
allowing investors and companies to pursue potentially fraudulent activity without fear of penalty.149
One theory as to China’s lack of effective oversight blames
the relative youth of the Chinese securities industry.150 While
the American regulatory regime arose in response to the Great
Depression,151 China has attempted to develop securities regulation in a time of prosperity. 152 Its regulatory bodies, which
oversee the banking and insurance industries, predate the
growth of China’s banks into some of the largest in the
world.153 Further, although the CSRC has been creating new
regulations quickly,154 it is too understaffed to enforce its own
laws.155 The current Chinese securities market consists of approximately 1,200 Chinese public reporting companies issuing
securities to a market of 1.3 billion people. 156 Nevertheless,
China does in fact have largely similar regulations to those
found in Western economies.157 Therefore, some academics con149. See Markets in China, supra note 14.
150. From 1989 to October 2002, China went from having no securities
market to a securities market with over 1,200 publicly listed companies.
These companies collectively constituted a market capitalization of 4.27 trillion yuan ($514.3 billion). Ji Chen & Stephen C. Thomas, The Ups and Downs
of the PRC Securities Market, 30 CHINA BUS. REV. 36, 36 (2003).
151. Q&A: Small Business and the SEC, supra note 97 (reciting that, in the
United States, Congress enacted the federal securities laws in response to the
Stock Market Crash of 1929 and tasked the SEC to administer them). The
United States has a history of reactionary financial regulatory legislation
beyond just the federal securities laws in the 1930s. The technology boom of
the 1960s involving Xerox, IBM, and Polaroid led to the passage of the Williams Act (regulating corporate takeovers), ERISA (regulating employee benefit plans), the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (amending existing antitrust law), and
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (providing for further accounting transparency), all in the 1970s. DeLaMater, supra note 82, at 115.
152. Yin, supra note 120, at 409.
153. Dinny McMahon & Aaron Back, Resignations Suggest Shift for China’s
ST.
J.
(Oct.
29,
2011),
Banks,
WALL
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203687504577003734190522
426.html. Despite China’s position as the world’s second largest economy, the
financial sector remains underdeveloped and regulators face major challenges. Id.
154. Yin, supra note 120, at 415.
155. See Chen & Thomas, supra note 150, at 39.
156. Id.; WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 3.
157. Yin, supra note 120, at 412–13. China looked to the Western regulatory structure for guidance when drafting the CSRC’s mandate. Id. In a sur-
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tend that the source of problems found in Chinese companies is
management, not government. 158 Due to the overwhelmingly
centralized state of the Chinese economy a generation ago,
these scholars argue, many Chinese falsely disclose information, manipulate markets, and trade on inside information
due to their lack of experience with capitalism.159
Putting aside the unlikely explanation of a cultural propensity towards deceitful behavior, the principal difference between
the Chinese and American financial regulatory systems remains the principal regulator’s willingness to pursue enforcement and independent accounting oversight of companies. 160
An examination of case studies confirms that accounting irregularities, as well as revelations of outright fraud, are frequently to blame for the underperformance of the many Chinese foreign private issuers listing in the United States via reverse
mergers.
B. The Underperformance of Reverse Merger Listings
As discussed above, many Chinese small businesses that
have sought to access American capital markets have done so
through a reverse merger with an existing American shell
company and subsequently listing either on an exchange, such
as the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) or the NASDAQ, or
on the over-the-counter (“OTC”) bulletin board system.161 Since
prising move, Premier Zhu Rongji recruited a Shanghai-born, U.S.-educated
woman to be Vice Chairperson of the CSRC. Some observers see this as an
attempt to “fall in line with Western securities regulation standards.” Id. For
a comparison of United States and Chinese securities regulation, see supra
notes 100–160 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., id. at 414; Finn, supra note 12, at 287.
159. See Yin, supra note 120, at 414 (noting “lack of experience in capitalistic economic policies” as a factor in regulatory problems plaguing China).
See also Finn, supra note 12, at 287 (describing a “cultural grounds for acceptance of bribery” and frequent corruption). Finn draws a connection between corruption and the emergence of the post-1978 Chinese economy. Id.
Further, he states that “corruption has an adverse effect on foreigners doing
business in China.” Id.
160. See, e.g., Robert Holmes, China Reverse-Merger Regulation Looks
Flawed,
CNBC
(Dec.
23,
2010,
6:01
PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/40787567/China_Reverse_Merger_Regulation_Looks_
Flawed.
161. Anderlini, supra note 89. Public companies which are not listed on an
exchange trade in the OTC market, a “securities quotation and trading system for broker-dealers.” Pavkov, supra note 90, at 508, 510–11. The OTC
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the goal of the Chinese company conducting a reverse merger is
to find an easy means to access the American public markets,
rather than the traditional merger motivation of finding a strategic partner, many of the reverse merger deals have involved
odd corporate combinations.162 For example, Winner Group, a
Chinese medical-device retailer, merged into the shell of Las
Vegas Resorts.163 Zhongsen International, a tire manufacturer,
likewise merged into the American shell of Rub A Dub Soap.164
Chinese foreign private issuers that have pursued this sort of
“backdoor listing” are not subject to SEC review or reporting,
nor are they subject to the rules and regulations issued by the
individual exchanges on which they list their securities.165
Despite Western enthusiasm over the wondrous growth in
China, many of the Chinese companies listing via reverse merger have underperformed.166 A Barron’s study of 158 Chinese
foreign private issuers in the United States shows that the median among them underperformed the benchmark Halter USX
CHINA Index by 75% and the Russell 2000 small-cap stock index by 66%.167 The American investor seeking to invest in the
Chinese small-business boom and the Chinese entrepreneur
seeking American growth capital bore the brunt of these losses.168

marketplace does not have the trading floor of an exchange. Id. at 508 (explaining that securities in the OTC marketplace are traded by dealers known
as “marketmakers.”). The OTC marketplace is particularly popular with Chinese foreign private issuers due to its lower standards for review and approval. Double Due Diligence Efforts Before Investing, supra note 92. See also
Pavkov, supra note 90, at 511 (describing the OTC bulletin board system and
the Pink Sheets as the “wild west of stock markets.”). The OTC marketplace
requires only that companies are current in their Exchange Act filings and
are not listed concurrently on any national securities exchange. Id. By contrast, the NYSE has the most stringent listing standards and often delists
companies that “significantly reduc[e] operating assets or scope of operations
and companies entering bankruptcy or liquidation.” Id. at 508. This makes
the NYSE a less popular venue for Chinese reverse mergers. See id. (explaining that public shells are deterred from remaining on the NYSE).
162. See Alpert & Norton, supra note 84.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Double Due Diligence Efforts Before Investing, supra note 92.
166. See, e.g., Alpert & Norton, supra note 84.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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The group of Chinese foreign private issuers listing via reverse merger has been described as a “minefield”169 of disappointment, often caused directly by accounting irregularities
and fraud.170 Examples of failed listings of this nature began
almost as soon as the first Chinese companies came to market.
Perhaps the most notable early case occurred in September
1997 when Asia Electronics Holding Company, a TV component manufacturer, raised forty-two million dollars on the
NASDAQ before going “into a tailspin” following the arrest of
its leader for “fraudulent investment schemes.”171 The scandal
proved to be merely the tip of the iceberg, however, and the full
scale of corporate fraud within Chinese foreign private issuers
continues to emerge to this day.
C. Recent Cases of Corporate Fraud and Accounting Irregularities
Chinese small businesses listing in the United States via reverse mergers engage in fraudulent accounting in China in order to attract growth-focused American investors.172 One of the
most-cited examples of this occurred in 2006 with China Expert
Technology, whose audited financial statements showed $175
million in revenue over four years. 173 Regulators discovered
that the company was a sham, with no revenue and few, if any,
customers.174
169. Id. Even large-cap stocks listing on the NYSE have been implicated.
The largest IPO of 2003, China Life Insurance, was quickly subject to a
shareholders’ derivative action due to accounting discrepancies. Finn, supra
note 12, at 287–88.
170. Anderlini, supra note 89.
171. Alpert & Norton, supra note 84. Asia Electronics was one of the first
Chinese listings on the NASDAQ. Id. Today, the NASDAQ is the most popular venue for Chinese foreign private issuers, with 159 China-based companies on the exchange. Holmes, supra note 160.
172. Many of these companies keep two sets of books: one for the Chinese
regulators and one for SEC examination. Holmes, supra note 160. For example, NYSE Euronext-listed China Green Agriculture, a fertilizer manufacturer, was alleged to have reported one set of sales and net income figures to the
SEC and a different set to the Chinese government. Id. The company’s stock
proceeded to lose 35% of its value after it admitted to the veracity of the
claims. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. The company was later subject to a class action suit brought by its
shareholders, who won a default judgment against China Expert Technology.
Id. The company, however, was entirely judgment-proof. Id.
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The vast scale of accounting scandals in Chinese foreign private issuers listing via reverse merger came to light in the
spring and summer of 2011. Between March and May of that
year, more than 24 Chinese foreign private issuers disclosed
auditor resignations or accounting problems, such as the inability to confirm balance sheet figures. 175 In June 2011, Orient
Paper, a cardboard manufacturer and NYSE Euronext-listed
Chinese company, lost two-thirds of its market capitalization
after analysts visited its factory and discovered it to be “idle
and dilapidated.” 176 The analysts, employed by Hong Kongbased Muddy Waters Research (“Muddy Waters”)—which has
built a reputation for being bearish on Chinese small-cap
stocks177—estimated that Orient Paper overstated the value of

All the assets are in China. The people are in China. [One] can’t so
much as serve a subpoena in China . . . . You can’t get any discovery
in China. The SEC would be completely blocked from any regulatory
action against a Chinese person or entity. What can they do? Nothing.
Id. (quoting Laurence Rosen, an attorney who represents disgruntled shareholders of China Expert Technology).
175. Bill Alpert, SEC Reports on China Reverse-Mergers, BARRON’S (May 5,
2011),
http://online.barrons.com/article/SB50001424052970203390704576305100837
510830.html.
176. Alpert & Norton, supra note 84. Carson C. Block, founder of investment firm Muddy Waters Research, describes Orient Paper’s headquarters as
a “Potemkin Village, littered with ‘junk machinery’ and ‘trash.’” David Barboza & Azam Ahmed, Muddy Waters Research Is a Thorn to Some Chinese
TIMES
(June
9,
2011,
9:20
PM),
Companies,
N.Y.
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/06/09/muddy-waters-research-is-a-thorn-tosome-chinese-companies. Block describes a pile of scrap cardboard that the
analysts found on the Orient Paper site, which the company had listed on
their balance sheet as “raw material” worth millions of dollars. Id.
177. Barboza & Ahmed, supra note 176. The firm’s name is derived from a
Chinese proverb that says that “the easiest way to catch fish is by muddying
the water, forcing it to the surface.” Id. “Muddy Waters . . . [is] taking direct
aim at reverse mergers [it] say[s] have dubious practices. The organization
[is] issuing research reports, posting surveillance videos and collecting corporate documents.” Id. “Small-cap” is shorthand for companies with a small
market capitalization, generally considered to be between $300 million and
$2
billion.
Small
Cap
Definition,
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/small-cap.asp (last visited Aug. 19,
2012).
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its assets by ten-fold and revenues by forty-fold in the course of
its SEC disclosure.178
That same month, the SEC halted trading and sought a
“stop-order” to cancel the effectiveness of the registration
statements of China Intelligent Lighting and Electronics Inc.
and China Century Dragon Media Inc.179 The SEC alleged that
each company had failed to publicly disclose that their auditors
had resigned after questioning the accuracy of each company’s
financial statements and bank records. 180 Similarly, Chinabased RINO International, a sewer equipment manufacturer,
was delisted by the NASDAQ181 after a short-seller uncovered
accounting discrepancies involving customer contracts that had
never been executed.182 RINO had gone through three auditors
and four chief financial officers in four years. 183 Shares lost
two-thirds of their value before the stock was delisted.184
Some of the premier institutional investors in the United
States have suffered losses when otherwise attractive deals
implode.185 The Carlyle Group, a private equity firm that has

178. Alpert & Norton, supra note 84.
179. Joshua Gallu, SEC Seeks Halt To Sales of 2 China-Based Stocks,
BLOOMBERG (June 13, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-13/secseeks-halt-to-sales-of-2-china-based-stocks.html.
180. Id. Resignation or dismissal of a company’s outside auditors requires
disclosure through an 8-K filing with the SEC. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note
86, at 163.
181. Each stock exchange registered with the SEC under the Exchange Act
has the authority to set listing standings, which issues must meet in order to
be listed on that exchange. Pavkov, supra note 90, at 508. The penalty for
failure to meet an exchange’s listing standards is often “delisting,” or removal
from the exchange. Id. Listing standards often include a required “number of
shareholders, trading volume, number of publicly held shares, aggregate
market value of shares outstanding, and total global market capitalization.”
Id. The NYSE has the most stringent listing standards, and therefore Chinese reverse mergers tend to occur on the regional exchanges and the OTC
marketplace. Id.
182. Holmes, supra note 160.
183. Alpert & Norton, supra note 84. The company also restated its financial results twice during that time period. Id.
184. Holmes, supra note 160. Investors in RINO lost $400 million. Id.
185. See Robert Cookson & Henny Sender, Carlyle Faces Questions over
TIMES
(May
5,
2011,
8:03
PM),
China
Investments,
FIN.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7971bb26-773e-11e0-aed6-00144feabdc0.html (describing The Carlyle Group’s problems with its Chinese investments). See
also Barboza & Ahmed, supra note 176 (stating that Paulson & Company,
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about $153 billion under management,186 bought a 22 percent
ownership interest in China Agritech, a NASDAQ-listed fertilizer manufacturer that came to the market in 2005 via a reverse merger. 187 Yet as of mid-2012, China Agritech faces
delisting from the exchange for failing to file its account on
time188 and the company has gone through three auditors in
three years. 189 Such examples demonstrate that the failures
seen in Chinese small-cap stocks are indicative of systemic
problems with regulation and oversight in China, and are not
due to inadequate due diligence on the part of the investor.
A significant dimension to the reversal merger scandals is
the fact that most of the activities have initially come to light
as a result of short-sellers’ independent research, only to be followed by regulatory investigations.190 Muddy Waters, one of the
more high profile Chinese foreign private issuer shortsellers,191 views its role as filing a gap in regulatory oversight
between the United States and China.192 RINO and China Media Express were each delisted after Muddy Waters accused
them of fraudulent activities.193 Similarly, regulators suspended Duoyuan Global Water after Muddy Waters made accusations of fraud against them.194 At Duoyuan, four of its six independent directors resigned after claiming the company’s management was obstructing its investigation into the corporation’s
internal controls and accounting.195
Muddy Waters also targeted a forestry company named SinoForest, a company listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange196 that
John A. Paulson’s hedge fund, lost billions of dollars after the collapse of Sino-Forest).
186. The Carlyle Grp. L.P., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Sept. 6,
2011),
available
at
http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1527166/000095012311082561/w83442sv1.
htm.
187. Cookson & Sender, supra note 185.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See Barboza & Ahmed, supra note 176.
191. See generally id.
192. See id. Muddy Waters describes itself as “regulat[ing] in an area with
little oversight.” Id.
193. Anderlini, supra note 89.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. Although Sino-Forest is not traded on a U.S. exchange, it is otherwise an apt case study of the issues and contentions raised in this Note.
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has become the poster-child for Chinese accounting fraud. 197
On June 2, 2011, Muddy Waters released a research report198
alleging that the company was a Ponzi scheme199 in the range
of $900 million.200 The essence of the claim by Muddy Waters
was that Sino-Forest vastly overstated its forestry holdings in
China.201 The stock slumped from a high of C$25.30 ($24.63)
per share in March 2011 to a low of C$1.99 ($1.94) following
the release of the Muddy Waters report.202 Trading of the stock
was thereafter halted by the Toronto Stock Exchange.203 Billions of dollars’ worth of investment funds have been lost as a
result of this series of Chinese reverse merger frauds, and the
situation continues to unfold as of this writing.204

197. Kaitlin Shung, Sino-Forest Sees Paulson & Co Sell Out As Fraud Allegations Linger, CHINA BRIEFING (June 21, 2011), http://www.chinabriefing.com/news/2011/06/21/sino-forest-sees-paulson-co-sell-out-asfraudulent-reporting-allegations-linger.html.
198. Anderlini, supra note 89.
199. A “Ponzi scheme” is “a fraudulent investing scam promising high rates
of return with little risk to investors.” Ponzi Scheme Definition,
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/ponzischeme.asp (last
visited Aug. 19, 2012).
The Ponzi scheme generates returns for older investors by acquiring
new investors. This scam actually yields the promised returns to earlier investors, as long as there are more new investors. These
schemes usually collapse on themselves when the new investments
stop.
Id.
200. Craig Stephen, China’s U.S.-Listed Stocks Are Junk, MARKETWATCH
(July 10, 2011, 10:48 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/chinas-uslisted-stocks-are-junk-2011-07-10.
201. Ian Austen, Sino-Forest Report Rejects Fraud Claims, With Caveats,
TIMES
(Nov.
15,
2011,
11:00
AM),
N.Y.
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/11/15/sino-forest-report-rejects-fraudclaims-with-caveats. Sino-Forest operated through a series of fifty-eight holding companies located in the British Virgin Islands and used third-parties to
act as middlemen. Id. Sino-Forest contended that “while unusual by Western
standards, [this is] an accepted way of doing business in China.” Id.
202. Markets in China, supra note 14.
203. Austen, supra note 201.
204. Michael Rapoport, Sen. Schumer Urges Audit Watchdog to Act on ChiST.
J.
(Nov.
22,
2011),
na,
WALL
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203710704577052543850533
540.html.
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D. The Regulatory Abyss
Scandals within the Chinese small-cap sector have cost
American investors approximately thirty-four billion dollars in
losses over the past five years. 205 In response, American exchanges are suspending a number of Chinese companies from
trading while inquiries proceed.206 Separately, the SEC is halting the offering of shares by these companies as they investigate claims of fraud against Chinese reverse merger listings.
The contention amongst many American investors, however, is
that these scandals should have never occurred in the first
place.207 Aspects of corporate internal control such as the production of accurate of financial statements and bank account
balances, as well as the elimination of accounting discrepancies, fit squarely within the realm of the auditors’, regulators’,
and exchanges’ responsibilities as gatekeepers. 208 While the
Chinese media contends that a few “bad apples” have tarnished
the sector, U.S. securities experts maintain that it is a series of
“fundamental weaknesses in the regulatory environment” surrounding reverse mergers that is to blame.209
Chinese foreign private issuers have fallen into a “regulatory
vacuum” of market regulation.210 The principal U.S. securities
regulator, the SEC, is too understaffed to review the heavy volume of reverse merger activity.211 Further, the SEC cannot en-

205. Holmes, supra note 160. The majority of these losses occurred in Chinese companies gaining access to the U.S. market through reverse mergers.
Id.
206. See Cookson & Sender, supra note 185. “Of the 19 NASDAQ stocks
currently suspended from trading, 15 are Chinese.” Id.
207. Holmes, supra note 160.
208. Some have argued that the Chinese lawyers, accountants, intermediaries, and stock promoters who bring these companies to market are small and
inexperienced, therefore neglecting to conduct sufficient due diligence or
proper audits. Anderlini, supra note 89. Nevertheless, ignorance cannot be
accepted as an excuse given the massive losses seen in the Chinese small-cap
space. Pavlo, supra note 90 (opining that the failure of Chinese company
management to learn American compliance requirements is no excuse for
fraud).
209. Holmes, supra note 160.
210. Anderlini, supra note 89.
211. The SEC has “hundreds of deals to review [in the small-cap space],
thousands of related financial statements, and no easy way to verify financial
statements that relate to operations in China.” Holmes, supra note 160 (stating that even assigning the entire Enforcement division’s resources for two
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force its regulations relating to the disclosure produced by
these companies as the fraudulent activities have occurred in
China, which lies outside of the SEC’s subpoena power.212
The principal Chinese securities regulator, the CSRC, has no
incentive to regulate shares of companies which are only
bought and sold in the United States.213 The CSRC has chosen
not to enforce its disclosure standards for Chinese businesses
trading on American exchanges in spite of its direct obligation
to do so—one of the CSRC’s codified functions is to “supervise
the offering of securities outside of China by Chinese enterprises.”214 In addition, despite the existence of a Memorandum of
Understanding between the SEC and the CSRC that calls for
enforcement cooperation between the two regulators, the CSRC
has shown little willingness to collaborate.215 Even within its
own jurisdiction, the CSRC rarely brings enforcement actions
against those companies defrauding investors and clients
through dodgy accounting practices.216
One of the most surprising aspects of the reverse merger
scandals is the extent to which the auditors of these troubled
companies are U.S.-registered accounting firms. 217 Some of
these auditors are small American firms that outsourced their
years to Chinese foreign private issuer investigations would barely make a
dent).
212. Alpert & Norton, supra note 84. Some have suggested that Chinese
small business owners are aware of this jurisdictional constraint on the SEC
and have acted accordingly. Holmes, supra note 160. Because of the number
of legal challenges that American regulators face internationally, some have
termed the United States a “paper tiger.” Kara Scannell, Reverse Mergers
Test U.S. Regulators, FIN. TIMES (July 4, 2011, 9:17 PM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/18338c8e-a65c-11e0-ae9c-00144feabdc0.html.
213. Alpert & Norton, supra note 84.
214. Friedman, supra note 16, at 483 (emphasis added).
215. Holmes, supra note 160. This Memorandum ostensibly served to “formalize a cooperative and consulting relationship” between the two regulators,
particularly with respect to technical and enforcement assistance. SEC and
China Securities Regulatory Commission Sign Memorandum of Understanding to Formalize Cooperative Relationship, News Release No. 94-35, 1994 WL
150804 (Apr. 28, 1994) [hereinafter SEC News Release]. The Memorandum of
Understanding between the United States and China was originally signed in
April 1994 and subsequently reaffirmed in May 2006. Holmes, supra note
160.
216. Markets in China, supra note 14.
217. Anderlini, supra note 89 (stating that 74 percent of Chinese reverse
merger companies were audited by U.S. firms).
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audit work to local firms in China. 218 However, several Big
Four 219 American accounting firms have also been implicated.220 In May 2011, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (“Deloitte”) resigned as auditor for Longtop Financial Technologies
(“Longtop”), a Chinese financial software company with $1.1
billion in stock market value.221 In a letter filed publicly with
the SEC, Deloitte explained that upon seeking confirmation of
bank account balances, Deloitte auditors were harassed by
company management, who “threat[ened] to stop [staff] from
leaving the company premises unless [the staff] allowed the
company to retain [Deloitte’s] audit files.” 222 These threats
came after Deloitte had discovered that Longtop did not have
any of the money that they had claimed in their books. 223
Shortly after Deloitte’s letter was filed, Longtop’s stock was
suspended from the NYSE and is now considered worthless.224
The fraud at Longtop is noteworthy because of the size of the
company and the fact that Chinese banks were allegedly
providing Deloitte with false bank statements supporting
Longtop’s inaccurate disclosures.225
218. Id.
219. The “Big Four” public accounting firms in the United States are
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers.
Big
Four
Public
Accounting
Firms,
ABOUT.COM,
http://financecareers.about.com/od/publicaccountingfirms/a/BigFour.htm (last
visited Nov. 4, 2011).
220. For example, China Media Express’s auditor, Deloitte, quit when the
accounting firm determined that they could “no longer . . . rely on the representations of [China Media Express] management.” Pavlo, supra note 90. In
addition, both Sino-Forest and China Agritech had used Big Four firm Ernst
& Young as their auditor. Floyd Norris, Troubled Audit Opinions, N.Y. TIMES
(June
9,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/10/business/10norris.html?_r=1;
James
Sterngold, Wall Street Scion Lost in China Agritech As Shorts Cry ‘Scam’,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 26, 2011, 7:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201104-26/wall-street-scion-lost-in-china-agritech-as-shorts-cry-scam-.html.
221. Norris, supra note 92. Deloitte had signed off on Longtop’s financial
statements for six years prior to their resignation. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. (“Longtop’s chairman, Jia Xiao Gong, told a Deloitte partner that
there was ‘fake cash recorded on the books because there had been ‘fake revenue in the past.’”).
224. Id.
225. Id. (“Just what, if anything, Chinese officials choose to do could provide
an indication about whether defrauding foreign investors is deemed a serious
crime in China.”).
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The Longtop scandal exploded into a global episode of fingerpointing between the United States and China.226 Deloitte now
finds itself in an uncomfortable bind between foreign regulators.227 Upon the revelation of the Longtop scandal, the SEC
asked Deloitte’s Shanghai office to produce its audit papers.228
The firm declined, stating that such production would place it
afoul of Chinese secrecy laws. 229 In October 2011, the SEC
brought suit against Deloitte, seeking an administrative subpoena.230 Should Deloitte ignore the subpoena, they will face a
criminal conviction for noncompliance. 231 Chinese regulators,
however, are preventing Deloitte’s Shanghai office from disclosing the information requested.232 The PCAOB has also become
embroiled in the mess, threatening to revoke Deloitte’s registration.233
The PCAOB, established to police accounting firms engaging
in poor gatekeeping of the exact type that has been occurring in
the Chinese reverse merger space, has been powerless to flex
its muscles as China will not let the PCAOB inspect local auditors engaged by American listed companies.234 In a comment
226. Pentland, supra note 15.
227. Auditing in China: Chinese Stall, ECONOMIST (Sept. 17, 2011),
http://www.economist.com/node/21529084 [hereinafter Auditing in China].
[T]he SEC is unlikely to back away from a case in which American
investors suffered losses based on what appears to be a rather brazen accounting fraud. And the Chinese government is unlikely to accede to allowing the auditors to respond to a subpoena that would
create a precedent for other firms being compelled to disclose their
work papers.
Peter J. Henning, Deloitte’s Quandary: Deft the S.E.C. or China, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 20, 2011, 2:30 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/20/deloittesquandary-defy-the-s-e-c-or-china.
228. Floyd Norris, Shhh! Don’t Name That Auditor, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13,
2011, 2:03 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/shhh-dontname-that-auditor.
229. Henning, supra note 227.
230. Norris, supra note 228.
231. Henning, supra note 227.
232. Pentland, supra note 15. “Deloitte China issued a press release stating:
‘As a matter of national sovereignty, the law of the People’s Republic of China
precludes our firm from producing the requested documents to a foreign regulator without approval from [the CSRC].’” Id.
233. Id.
234. Alpert & Norton, supra note 84. This includes the Chinese affiliates of
American Big Four firms. Norris, supra note 92. James Doty, chairman of the
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letter sent to the SEC in May 2009, the CSRC stated that the
PCAOB should “fully rely on the work of the CSRC.”235 Further, the Chinese government has expressed its disagreement
with the PCAOB’s “unilateral basis” for foreign inspections,236
citing sovereignty concerns. 237 As the scandals surrounding
Chinese reverse merger companies escalated in the summer
and fall of 2011, U.S. Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY) sent a
letter to the PCAOB urging them to exert their enforcement
authority to bar any Chinese accounting firms that are not subject to PCAOB inspection from performing audit work on Chinese companies listed in the United States.238 “This standoff,”
Senator Schumer wrote, “has gone on long enough.”239
The SEC/PCAOB and the CSRC have come to a standstill,
with each side waiting for the other to blink. Given the magnitude of the current crisis of confidence in the audits of Chinese
foreign private issuers, initiative needs to be taken that goes
beyond the exchange of letters and bypasses the use of diplomatic summits that may be futile, costly, and time-consuming.
IV. PROPOSALS TO REGULATE CHINESE FOREIGN PRIVATE
ISSUERS
It is imperative that there be a regulatory framework that
will allow Chinese companies to access the U.S. capital markets while assuring American investors that the issuer is
transparent and fully honest in its disclosures. Further, any
regulatory framework must be enforceable, an aspect that the
Chinese have forgone in the past.240 As word of the troubles in
PCAOB, has termed this “a gaping hole in investor protection.” Michael
Rapoport, Progress Cited on Audits in China, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 9, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904140604576495290600231
986.html.
235. Elizabeth P. Gray & Jessica L. Matelis, PCAOB Foreign Inspections—
A Chinese Conundrum, 44 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 145, 150 (2011).
236. Id.
237. Rapoport, supra note 204.
238. Id. “The board’s failure to do what it was created to do—particularly in
the face of Chinese corporate accounting scandals that have already cost U.S.
investors billions—is deeply troubling.” Id.
239. Id.
240. Markets in China, supra note 14 (“Reports of prosecutions in China
over dodgy accounting in cases where investors or clients are victims remain
scarce.”). See also David A. Caragliano, Note, Administrative Governance As
Corporate Governance: A Partial Explanation for the Growth of China’s Stock
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the Chinese small-cap space spreads, and without any new
regulatory schemes, American investors will inevitably be driven away from the market.241 The losers, in the end, will be the
many legitimate Chinese entrepreneurs who are deprived of
fundraising opportunities abroad as well as international investors pursuing a growth-oriented investment strategy.242
The instinctive reaction is to suggest that American regulators enact an outright prohibition on reverse mergers. However, this proposal is not prudent. The reverse merger technique,
effectuated properly, can provide benefits to both the company
and investors.243 Small-cap, private companies have special financing needs that reverse mergers may be able to effectuate.244 For example, reverse mergers allow smaller companies
to access new capital and to promote themselves to new investors in the public markets. 245 Investors benefit from reverse
mergers by gaining access to “embryonic companies with high
growth potential.”246 Such access is typically only available to
venture capital firms and their respective investors. 247 AltMarkets, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1273, 1311 (2009) (“Like most transition economies, China has exhibited under-enforcement of its securities laws, and companies have operated under non-market standards.”).
241. See Holmes, supra note 160 (describing how investors can no longer
assume that a company’s presence on an American exchange represents any
degree of integrity).
242. “Even the harshest critics of the [reverse merger] category concede
that there are plenty of Chinese companies—even small caps—offering solid
opportunities for investors. At the same time, the skeptics caution that individual investors will likely find it difficult to separate the good from the bad.”
Id.
243. See, e.g., Pavkov, supra note 90, at 513.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 489. As the company’s exposure grows, it may find additional
opportunities to finance its operations through equity as a result of its use of
the reverse merger mechanism. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. Venture capital funds escape registration requirements under the
Investment Company Act of 1940 by limiting their investors only to those
who are “qualified purchasers.” Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §
80a-3(c)(7) (2011). A “qualified purchaser” is defined as an individual with at
least five million dollars in investments. Id. at § 80a-2(a)(51). Therefore, the
majority of retail investors do not have access to venture capital funds. See
Pavkov, supra note 90, at 489. Further, small businesses have difficulty pursuing IPOs through the traditional process of seeking investment bankers to
underwrite their securities. Id. This is attributable to the fact that investment bankers prefer to underwrite lower-risk companies. Id. Therefore, “non-
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hough substantial due diligence may be required, retail investors should not be impeded from pursuing a growth investment
strategy through investment in reverse merger companies.248
There is a better course than prohibiting reverse merger
transactions. The essence of an improved regulatory framework
capable of confronting these challenges is a stronger regulation
of the accounting firms that have certified these troubled companies. The extent to which the “reputational intermediaries”
or gatekeepers, on whom investors have traditionally relied to
verify disclosure, have participated in the frauds is troubling.249
Since PCAOB-led examinations of the audits of Chinese foreign
private issuers are being frustrated by the Chinese government, the answer must come from within China’s borders.
Simply put, if the Chinese will not allow the American regulators to properly execute their mandate, then the burden should
be on the Chinese to oversee those Chinese accountancy firms
that are signing off on the audits of companies listing on American exchanges. The first step towards effective regulation of
these listings is the creation, by the Chinese government, of an
organic independent auditing oversight body that will internally regulate Chinese gatekeepers. The creation of the PCAOB
through the passage of SOX in the United States could provide
a template for the Chinese establishment of a new counterpart
to the PCAOB. Such an organization would ideally work with
the PCAOB to set international standards.
An independent auditing oversight body in China is needed
because China’s accounting firms themselves are failing inveselites are unable to invest in riskier startups.” Id. In sum, the reverse merger
provides an alternative to venture capital funded IPOs for small businesses
to go public and allows the average investor to potentially profit. See id.
248. Double Due Diligence Efforts Before Investing, supra note 92. Diligence
on Chinese foreign private issuer investments should include “working closely with experienced legal counsel, accountants and, occasionally, private investigation firms to affirm an investee’s representations, as well as speaking
with its clients. . . . [A] visit to the investee’s operations should be conducted.”
Id. China is a very promising market, but effort is required to find investments of true value. Id.
249. Caragliano, supra note 240, at 1311. Dan David, vice president at
GeoInvesting, another Chinese small-cap short-seller, stated: “We had counted on the fee collectors—the investment banks, the accountants and the lawyers—to tell us what was right . . . . Now, we’re doing our own due diligence,
and hiring people in China to investigate.” Barboza & Ahmed, supra note
176.
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tors in their capacities as gatekeepers. 250 China’s accounting
firms bear few, if any, penalties for their failure to produce accurate financial reports.251 In addition, the CSRC has shown a
“general unwillingness to enforce its standards in its core competence of securities regulation.”252 The lack of regulation and
enforcement by the CSRC is in direct opposition to its mission
of “supervis[ing] the offering of securities outside of China by
Chinese enterprises.” 253 The CSRC’s nonfeasance also runs
against its commitment to work with the American regulators
in the area of “technical and enforcement assistance.”254 It appears inevitable that any oversight of auditing, which relies on
the CSRC for implementation and enforcement, “may not turn
out to be terribly meaningful” to Chinese companies listing in
the United States.255
Opponents to the creation of such an organization, however,
will argue that the implementation of SOX-like legislation
abroad is unwarranted because SOX unfairly burdens foreign
private issuers.256 On a general level, SOX has been challenged

250. Clarke, supra note 136, at 161. The legal and accountancy professions
in the United States are considerably more developed and sophisticated than
their Chinese equivalents. Id. China has few lawyers and its law schools do
not emphasize the goals of investor protection that the United States believes
is at the heart of securities law. See id. Further, Chinese accountants “are not
trained to handle complex financial matters.” Id.
251. Caragliano, supra note 240, at 1304 (“Chinese lawmakers have struggled to articulate a workable liability standard for accountants.”). The CSRC
has not made the sanctioning of accounting firms a priority. Clarke, supra
note 136, at 161–66 (describing only seven civil actions in the last ten years
brought against accounting firms, each of which concerned creditors lending
to companies on the basis of inaccurate financial certifications). Litigation in
response to investor complaints relating to inaccurate certifications is nonexistent. See id. at 165.
252. Clarke, supra note 136, at 180. Clark suggests that the CSRC’s unwillingness to regulate “stems from its dual mission as market regulator and
market promoter for the state.” Id.
253. Friedman, supra note 16, at 483 (emphasis added).
254. SEC News Release, supra note 215. See also Yin, supra note 120, at
412.
255. Clarke, supra note 136, at 180.
256. See, e.g., Christopher Hung Nie Woo, United States Securities Regulation and Foreign Private Issuers: Lessons from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 48 AM.
B. L.J. 119, 174 (2011); Lee J. Potter, Jr. & Eberhard Röhm, SEC Extends
Sarbanes-Oxley Deadline for Some Foreign Companies, ARENT FOX LLP (Sept.
14,
2006),
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on the grounds that its initiatives conflict with other nations’
local regulatory practices.257 Specifically with respect to foreign
private issuers, SOX opponents contend that the compliance
costs required are prohibitive for smaller companies.258 There is
evidence that some foreign private issuers exited the American
market following the passage of SOX and that the legislation
caused other foreign companies to opt not to list in the United
States.259 While SOX remains controversial as applied to foreign private issuers, it has resulted in the creation of an enforcement and regulatory body for auditing firms, the PCAOB,
a necessary evil in an industry that has proven to be incapable
of self-regulation.260 If China continues to cite sovereignty concerns as the basis for barring PCAOB inspections within its
borders,261 then the best solution is the creation by China of an
independent body similar to the PCAOB to regulate its auditing firms.
This proposed regulatory structure has already proven successful in the United States. The PCAOB has worked effectively as a regulator of gatekeepers because SOX provided for
stringent enforcement of the increased regulation, which is
something the current Chinese regime refuses to do.262 To provide one important example, SOX and the PCAOB make individuals personally accountable for the accuracy of financial disclosures.263 Corporate officers are subject to severe civil or even
http://www.arentfox.com/publications/index.cfm?content_id=602&fa=legalUp
dateDisp.
257. Woo, supra note 256, at 141–42. For example, during SOX’s public
comment period, Germans raised the issue that the law’s certification requirements are premised on an issuer having one CEO. Id. at 142 (noting
that, in German companies, multiple directors may jointly represent the
company in a capacity similar to the American CEO).
258. Potter & Röhm, supra note 256. At issue in particular is Section 404,
which requires that companies produce an assessment of the effectiveness of
their internal controls in their Annual Report on Form 10-K. Id.
259. Woo, supra note 256, at 144.
260. See Cunningham & Harris, supra note 118, at 46. Prior to the Arthur
Andersen scandal, the accounting profession in the United States was subject
to self-regulation or limited oversight on the state-level. See id.
261. See Rapoport, supra note 204.
262. See Markets in China, supra note 14.
263. Cunningham & Harris, supra note 118, at 46. Corporate officers must
certify that “the financial statements . . . fairly present in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of the issuer.” 15
U.S.C. § 7241. This motivates senior officers to become more actively involved
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criminal liability for inaccurate financial statements.264 Financial statement certifications are required to accompany every
annual and quarterly report filed in accordance with the Exchange Act.265 Officers are also required to certify their company’s internal control structure.266 A separate certification must
be made by the auditor to “attest to, and report on, the assessment made by the management of the issuer . . . in accordance
with standards for attestation engagements issued or adopted
by the [PCAOB].”267 These initiatives have proved successful in
reinstituting integrity into American financial reporting.268 If
the Chinese are willing to implement the certification requirements of SOX and an independent accounting oversight board
similar to PCAOB, the plan could be effective in enforcing more
stringent regulation of corporate officials and gatekeepers.269
In addition, increased collaboration between the United
States and China could supplement China’s creation of an accounting oversight board and certification standards.270 To foster such collaboration, though, it will be necessary to update
and utilize the Memorandum of Understanding between the
SEC and the CSRC.271 The current version of the agreement
dates to 1994 and needs to be revised to reflect actual procedural and information-sharing initiatives between the two regulators.272 In July 2011, in a positive signal for future collaboin the disclosure process and to “take personal responsibility for their financial documents.” Lucci, supra note 117, at 229–30. See also Cunningham &
Harris, supra note 118, at 46.
264. Cunningham & Harris, supra note 118, at 46; Lucci, supra note 117, at
230. “These stiff punishments [are] designed to send a strong message to corporate executives.” Lucci, supra note 117, at 230.
265. Woo, supra note 256, at 139.
266. 15 U.S.C. § 7262.
267. Id. at § 7262(b).
268. Kevin W. Kelley, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Foreign Private Issuers,
in U.S. SECURITIES LAWS AND FOREIGN PRIVATE ISSUERS 211, 227 (Brian Lane
ed., 2007).
269. The SEC has used the certification requirements of SOX in post-Enron
enforcement actions. See PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 86, at 164. For example, the SEC successfully prosecuted the CFO of HealthSouth on charges of
false and reckless SOX certifications. Id.
270. Finn, supra note 12, at 313 (“The SEC recognizes that international
cooperation is vital to the SEC’s ability to regulate international securities
transactions.”).
271. Id. at 319.
272. Id. at 314.
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ration, a delegation of SEC and PCAOB officials met in Beijing
with China’s Ministry of Finance and the CSRC.273 However,
the Chinese cancelled a subsequent meeting scheduled to take
place in Washington, D.C. in October 2011 and talks have since
stalled.274
The problems presented by poor auditing standards are
threatening the financial stability of the small-cap market and
demand redress. Implementation by China of an independent
accounting oversight board and certification standards providing personal liability to corporate officers can help to regulate
the audits coming out of China. The regulators on both sides of
the Pacific, however, need to work together. The United States
wants to protect its investors and China wants to ensure easy
access to financing for its firms that wish to list abroad.275 An
alliance between these two economic powers is necessary for
investors to have faith in Chinese audits.276
CONCLUSION
The Chinese regulatory regime continues to be troubled by a
“high degree of corruption and a low degree of transparency.”277
The instances of accounting irregularities and corporate fraud
that were uncovered in the summer and fall of 2011 highlight
the problems China faces as it continues its assent as a global
economic power. By refusing to properly enforce the production
of accurate financial information by its companies listed
abroad, and thwarting American efforts to do the same, China
is hurting foreign investors, damaging the reputation of its
economy and national character, and ultimately, hurting many
of its own citizens who seek foreign capital to fund their new
businesses. The SEC and the CSRC are currently at an impasse, harming each of their interests. The implementation of
an independent accounting oversight board in China, along
with more stringent certification requirements, will cause the
Chinese to be more proactive in regulating gatekeepers and allow for investor confidence in the audits of Chinese foreign pri273. Tammy Whitehouse, SEC, PCAOB Send Delegation to China,
COMPLIANCE WK. (July 7, 2011), http://www.complianceweek.com/sec-pcaobsend-delegation-to-china/article/206996.
274. Rapoport, supra note 204.
275. Auditing in China, supra note 227.
276. Id.
277. Finn, supra note 12, at 315.
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vate issuers. Finally, the U.S. and Chinese regulators need to
work together to ensure that the fraudulent activities of American-listed Chinese issuers are eliminated, thereby ensuring a
free and efficient flow of capital between the two nations.
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